ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Appeal Nos. 2026-1033-1035 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2026)

In our Case of the Week, a fifteen-year old legal battle returned to the Federal Circuit for the third time.  This time, it was returned for lack of jurisdiction because the district court had not entered a final judgment in the case.

The case involves two patents covering two types of patent claims.  Some of the claims concerned down-conversion of electromagnetic signals, referred to in the case as the “receiver claims.”  The remaining claims concerned up-conversion of signals from low frequency to high frequency, referred to as “transmitter claims.”  The ‘907 patent’s asserted claims were all receiver claims.  The asserted claims in the ‘940 patent included both receiver and transmitter claims.

The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to both the transmitter and receiver claims.  That decision was appealed.  In ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 116 F.4^th 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2024), the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded that decision for further proceedings.  The Court reversed the decision as the receiver claims because the district court had erred in applying collateral estoppel to those claims.  The Court reversed the transmitter claims because of an evidentiary issue—the district court erroneously excluded ParkerVision’s expert witness.

On remand, the district court engaged in a claim construction process.  As a result, the parties stipulated that Qualcomm’s accused products did not infringe the receiver claims in either patent.  That disposed of all claims of the ‘907 patent and some of the claims in the ‘940 patent.  Instead of proceeding to trial on the transmitter claims, the court entered “final judgment” of non-infringement of the receiver claims.  It then “severed and stayed” the transmitter claims pending conclusion of the appeal.  ParkerVision then appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because final judgment had not been entered as to any claims.  Specifically, a “claim” as that term is referenced in Rule 54(b) concerns a cause of action, not a patent claim.  At issue were claims that a patent had been infringed.  With respect to the ‘940 patent, final judgment had not been entered as to that cause of action because the transmitter claims remained pending.  Thus, no “final judgment” as to a “claim” of infringement of that patent had been entered.  While this was the first time the Court had reached this issue as a matter of precedent, it noted a prior, non-precedential opinion and multiple district court opinions that had reached the same conclusion.

As to the ‘907 patent, all asserted claims of which were receiver claims, the Court found the requirements of Rule 54(b) not satisfied.  That Rule allows an appeal of less than all claims “only if the [district] court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”  The district court failed to do that in this case.  It’s “final judgment” was thus treated as a decision that did not constitute “final judgment.”  The Court declined to treat the appeal as a request to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 find the district court should have considered that question in the first instance.

ParkerVision also asked to have the case reassigned to a different judge on remand.  The Court declined to grant such relief finding no basis under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.  Even if the Court had found some grounds for reassigning the case (which it did not), the inefficiencies of transferring a case of such complexity to a new judge would have counseled against it.

The opinion can be found here.  We will await a decision on the fourth appeal for our next write-up in this matter.

By: Nika Aldrich

ALSO THIS WEEK

Teva Pharmaceuticals Int’l Gmbh et al. v. Eli Lilly and Co., Appeal No. 2024-1094 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2026)

The Federal Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc in a case from April, in which the Court had reinstated a verdict finding willful infringement against Eli Lilly on Teva’s claims directed to the use of certain humanized antibodies to treat headaches.  The district court had granted JMOL that Teva’s asserted claims were invalid, reasoning that the recited genus of antibodies was not fully enabled.  The Court disagreed, distinguishing cases like Amgen Inc v. Sanofi, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021) because the claims were not directed to the genus of antibodies itself—as opposed to a method of their use—and a reasonable jury could find that creation of the necessary antibodies was well-known and routine.  Indeed, Teva’s claims directed to the relevant genus had been found invalid over the prior art in related inter partes reviews.  Our write-up of the original decision can be found here.

Judge Dyk dissented from the decision to deny rehearing en banc, focusing on the panel’s distinction of Amgen on grounds that the upheld claims did not claim the genus itself as their invention.  Judge Dyk noted that the panel “explicitly… assume[d] that the amount of time and expense required… would have constituted undue experimentation” (cleaned up), and found no meaningful difference between the scope of a (presumably) non-enabled claim to the genus, on the one hand, and on the other, a claim directed to the only use for that genus reflected in the record.  The dissent agreed with certain amici that the opinion permitted an “end-run around Amgen” that risked “undermin[ing] medical innovation by sustaining overly broad claims.”

The decision denying rehearing and Judge Dyk’s dissent can be found here.

By: Jason Wrubleski

Satius Holding, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Appeal No. 2025-1446 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 1, 2026)

The Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment invalidating three claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,711,385, owned by Satius, in an infringement suit against Samsung.  Independent claim 1 of the ‘385 patent recites “[a] communications apparatus for transmitting electric or electromagnetic signals over air.” The district court construed claim 1 to encompass transmitting signals over air in electric form, which it recognized as scientifically impossible. Based on this impossibility, the court held that the claims were indefinite and therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction of claim 1 but disagreed that it rendered the claims indefinite. The Court explained that “indefiniteness is not the same as impossibility,” and that an “invention’s operability may say nothing about a skilled artisan’s understanding of the bounds of the claim.” Here, the Court found that even though the claims encompassed impossible inventions, the scope of the claims remained clear. Despite reversing the indefiniteness finding, the Federal Circuit affirmed invalidity based on a lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The Court explained that to satisfy § 112(a), the patent specification must enable the full scope of the invention defined by its claims. Given the impossibility of one of the claimed embodiments, the Court observed that the claims “fall woefully short of this burden.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity in favor of Samsung.

The opinion can be found here.

By: Adam Astorina

Epic Tech, LLC v. Pen-Tech Assocs., Inc., Appeal No. 2025-1624 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2026)

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Northern District of Georgia’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and motion for attorneys’ fees and costs for allegedly frivolous infringement claims by Epic Tech, on patents found to be patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Rule 11 sanctions and fees, because Epic Tech had notice of its asserted claims’ invalidity prior to filing suit.  First, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) widely affected patent subject matter eligibility under § 101. Second, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office rejected purportedly indistinct claims under § 101 in three of Epic Tech’s related applications. Third, Epic Tech had received an adverse ruling in separate litigation concerning a related patent, where the Southern District of Texas held similar claims were invalid under § 101 at summary judgment. Given these indicia that its claims were ineligible, the Federal Circuit concluded that Epic Tech could not rely solely on the presumption of validity of its patent to avoid a fee award.

The Federal Circuit declined to rule on whether a Rule 11 violation had actually occurred or on Pen-Tech’s entitlement to fees, but found that the District Court failed to adequately explain its rationale given the “number of strong indicators” that the asserted claims were invalid.  Accordingly, the Court vacated for further proceedings.

The opinion can be found here.

By: Elizabeth Graves

This article summarizes aspects of the law and does not constitute legal advice. For legal advice with regard to your situation, you should contact an attorney.