Ingevity Corporation v. BASF Corporation, Appeal No. 2024-1577 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2026)

In our Case of the Week, the Federal Circuit affirmed a $85 million antitrust verdict from the District of Delaware, based on Ingevity’s unlawful tying of a patent license to the purchase of “staple goods.”

Both parties sell carbon honeycombs for use in automobile air-intake systems and fuel vapor canisters.  The honeycombs are used to control emissions from automobiles, by filtering air entering the engine, and capturing gasoline vapors released from the gas tank.  Ingevity sued BASF for infringement of U.S. Patent RE38,844 (“the ’844 patent”), which describes and claims systems and methods for reducing emissions from an automobile’s gas tank.  Honeycombs used in the air-intake system do not come within the scope of the ’844 patent, but honeycombs used in fuel vapor canisters do.  BASF brought counterclaims for illegal tying under the Sherman Act, alleging that Ingevity conditioned licenses to the ’844 patent on customers’ agreements to fulfill their honeycomb product needs by exclusively purchasing Ingevity’s honeycomb products, products which can be used for infringing and non-infringing purposes.

At trial, Ingevity admitted that  “in order to obtain a license [to the ’844 patent,] Ingevity requires that customers buy the honeycombs only from Ingevity.”  Ingevity argued that its conduct was not illegal tying because its honeycomb products were “nonstaple goods,” i.e., goods lacking substantial non-infringing uses, and therefore protected from antitrust liability because a patent holder has a statutory right to control nonstaple goods.  The jury found that Ingevity’s honeycombs were staple goods (i.e., goods with substantial non-infringing uses), and therefore Ingevity was not allowed to control the market for such goods, and its conduct constituted anti-competitive tying.

Ingevity moved for JMOL or a new trial, challenging the jury verdict by asserting a statutory patent misuse defense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) for nonstaple goods.  Ingevity argued that there was no record evidence that Ingevity intended for its honeycombs to be used for non-infringing purposes, that anyone used its honeycombs for non-infringing purposes, or that any non-infringing uses were substantial.  Ingevity also tried to reframe its tying conduct as mere communications that it would enforce its patent rights against conduct Ingevity believed to be infringing.  The District Court found no reason to depart from the jury’s findings.

Ingevity appealed the denial of JMOL, arguing that: (1) it may take advantage of the patent misuse defense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), and that there was not substantial evidence for the jury to find that its honeycombs were staple goods; (2) its purported tying conduct was mere good faith enforcement of its patents, immune under the patent laws and First Amendment; and (3) the jury’s antitrust damages should be vacated because BASF failed to disaggregate the damages caused by Ingevity’s unlawful conduct from those resulting from its lawful patent enforcement.

On the patent misuse defense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), the defense turned on whether BASF could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the goods have actual and substantial non-infringing uses, i.e., that they were staple goods.  Ingevity’s challenges to this finding were all challenges to the determinations made by the jury, and the Federal Circuit found there was more than enough evidence that Ingevity’s honeycombs were staple goods for the District Court to leave the jury’s determinations intact and deny JMOL.

On Ingevity’s arguments that its tying conduct constituted mere good faith enforcement actions, protected under the patent laws and First Amendment, Ingevity argued that it had a good faith belief that its honeycombs were nonstaple goods, for which it was allowed to control the market.  However, this immunity argument was different than the immunity argument Ingevity previously raised, and Ingevity had not preserved this new argument, so the Federal Circuit held for BASF here.

On Ingevity’s argument that the damages from its unlawful tying were not disaggregated from damages caused by lawful enforcement, BASF only had to show that the unlawful tying was a material cause of the damages, not the sole cause.  The jury heard credible arguments that the tying materially caused BASF’s damages, and that it was impossible to disaggregate damages caused by the unlaw and lawful conduct, and the Federal Circuit held for BASF here too.

The full opinion can be found here.

By Tyler Hall

ALSO THIS WEEK

Apple Inc. v. Squires, Appeal No. 2024-1864 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2026)

In a return to the Federal Circuit following a prior appeal, which we wrote about in 2023 as our Case of the Week here, the Court affirmed a district court holding that the Director of the Patent Office did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) by issuing decisions designated as “precedential” without following rulemaking procedures under the APA.  At issue were the NHK and Fintiv decisions, which were designated “precedential” by the prior administration.  Those two decisions established factors for rejecting petitions for inter partes review while litigation was pending.  The prior appeal, in 2023, established that Apple had standing to challenge the decisions.  The district court thereafter dismissed Apple’s case, finding that the NHK and Fintiv decisions did not constitute impermissible rulemaking under the APA, but instead qualified as “general statement of policy,” which are excepted from APA rulemaking requirements.  In a lengthy, 22-page opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Notably, in light of the changes in IPR policies since John Squires became Director, NHK and Fintiv are not currently in effect in any event.

The full opinion can be found here.

By Nika Aldrich

Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, Appeal No. 2024-1541 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2026)

In an appeal from an inter partes review decision upholding challenged claims, the Court reviewed the Board’s construction of a disputed claim limitation, “locating encryption information that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.”  The Federal Circuit found the board erred, vacated the Board’s non-obviousness decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Board’s conclusion of non-obviousness depended on construing the modifier “within the requested portions” as applying to the “encryption information,” not the “frames of video.”  The Federal Circuit began its analysis with the “precepts of English grammar,” and noted that the placement of a comma following the terms “frames of video” would have made the meaning unambiguous, i.e. the modifier would be understood as applying to the “encryption information, not the “frames of video.”  However, with the comma lacking, there was only a presumptive interpretation that the modifier did not apply to the “encryption information.”

The Court noted that, because the grammar only created a presumptive interpretation, the intrinsic evidence must be reviewed to check whether that intrinsic evidence overcomes the presumptive interpretation.  Although the most fully elaborated embodiments in the specification did describe the “encryption information” within the frames of video, the specification also included alternative embodiments in which the “encryption information” was not within the frames of video. Given the presence of these alternative embodiments, the Court concluded that the intrinsic evidence did not overcome the presumptive interpretation.  The Court reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated its conclusion of non-obviousness on this basis, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s construction.

(From 20+ years of patent prosecution experience, this author notes that if the intent was to limit the claims to the most fully elaborated embodiments to distinguish the prior art, re-phrasing to remove the word “that” almost always improves clarity and understanding.  For instance, to distinguish the prior art, the critical limitation could have been written without the word “that” as: “locating, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, encryption information identifying encrypted portions of frames of video.”)

The full opinion can be found here.

By Michael A. Cofield

GoTV Streaming, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., Appeal Nos. 2024-1669, -1744 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2026)

In a case asserting infringement of several patents regarding rendering commands for wireless devices, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court denial of judgment on the pleadings and found GoTV’s patents ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. U.S. Patent Nos. 8,478,245; 8,989,715; and 8,103,865 concern methods and systems involving a server that receives requests for content from wireless devices and delivers the content in accordance with specifications related to the devices’ capabilities.  The Federal Circuit applied the traditional two step analysis under Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), finding the claims to be directed to an abstract idea that fails to provide the required specificity.

GoTV Streaming LLC (“GoTV”) argued that its patents provide improvements to computer/network technology and are therefore not directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining, inter alia, that the claims’ recitation of “algorithm” and “architecture” are highly general labels that fail to identify details regarding how the patents improve system function. Without specificity regarding how GoTV’s content specifications are tailored to meet the requirements of a wireless devices, the Court found the claims patent ineligible.

The opinion can be found here.

By Trevor Gruwell

This article summarizes aspects of the law and does not constitute legal advice. For legal advice with regard to your situation, you should contact an attorney.